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Abstract: This article aims to provide a metaphysical elucidation of a 
specific model of the doctrine of the Trinity: Monarchical Trinitarianism, 
within the formal, neo–Aristotelian ontological and metaphysical 
framework of Jonathan Lowe (i.e. his four–category ontology and serious 
essentialism). Formulating the model through this ontological and 
metaphysical framework will enable us to explicate it in a clear and 
consistent manner, and the important 'multiple–natures' problem raised 
against the proposed model will be shown to be ineffective. 
 




According to pro–Nicene Trinitarianism, there exists within the Trinity three 
‘persons’ (ὑπόστασις) who each share one divine ‘nature’ (οὐσία). 1 In certain 
streams of contemporary analytic and historical theology, this one divine nature 
is taken to be a numerically singular universal of divinity that renders the persons 
as homoousios (i.e. them ‘possessing’ or ‘being of’ one nature) due to each of them 
individually instantiating this universal. This instantiation–based position, 
however, faces a problem, termed the ‘multiple–natures problem’, which 
threatens to place it outside of the boundaries of pro–Nicene Trinitarianism. 
More specifically, as Timothy Pawl (2020) has highlighted,2 an instantiation 
relation seems not to ‘fit the bill’ for the task of further elucidating the doctrine 
 
1 Pro–Nicene Trinitarianism, which developed in the second half of the 4th century, centred on 
a certain set of principles that governed the grammar of trinitarian discourse for the Greek and 
Latin speaking theologians, who favoured the interpretation of Trinitarianism provided by the 
First Council of Nicaea (325 CE) and the First Council of Constantinople (381 CE), and whose 
defense of the consubstantiality and irreducibility of the Father, the Son and the Spirit set the 
standard for Trinitarian orthodoxy. For a further detailing and explanation of the notion of "pro–
Nicene", see: (Ayres, 2004, 239).  
2 Pawl (2020) did not fully explicate the critique of the development of the model featured in 
this article. Thus, the ‘multiple–natures’ problem should be seen as a further development of his 
critique. 




of the Trinity. As it stands, on the one hand, it fails to provide a plausible 
construal of the necessary ‘Person–Nature’ relation that fundamentally ties each 
of the Trinitarian persons to the one universal of divinity. However, on the other 
hand, it will also need to preserve the ontological unity of the persons, which is 
central to the doctrine of the Trinity—namely, the persons being homoousios.3 But, 
as the objection goes, the relation of instantiation, unfortunately, enables a 
proliferation of particular divine natures within the Trinitarian life and thus fails 
to achieve this second task. In other words, it ultimately allows a form of 
ontological disunity to creep into the depths of the foundation of the Trinity, 
which an adherent of pro–Nicene Trinitarianism would clearly find problematic. 
The aim of this article will thus be focused on introducing, and coming to the 
defense of, a specific model of the Trinity: Monarchical Trinitarianism, which 
seems to be plagued by this issue, once a helpful metaphysical elucidation is 
provided for it. This defense will thus be made by providing a further 
metaphysical development of the proposed model within the neo–Aristotelian 
ontological and metaphysical framework of Jonathan Lowe (i.e. his four–
category ontology and serious essentialism). Elucidating this specific model 
within this ontological and metaphysical framework, will enable it (and others 
like it) to be placed squarely within the boundaries of pro–Nicene Trinitarianism 
and thus the ‘multiple–natures’ problem (and any other variant of it) will be 
shown to be a non–issue for a neo–Aristotelian based Trinitarianism. 
Thus, the plan is as follows: in section 1 (‘Monarchical Trinitarianism and the 
Multiple–Natures Problem’) I briefly introduce the model of Monarchical 
Trinitarianism and provide a helpful metaphysical elucidation of it (in light of 
the model of Social Trinitarianism). I then highlight an important problem that 
can be raised against this proposed development, which I term the multiple–
natures problem. Then, in section 2 (‘A Neo–Aristotelian Ontology’) I unpack 
Jonathan Lowe’s four–category ontology by detailing the fundamental categories 
in this ontology and the various formal ontological relations that connect these 
categories together. In section 3 (‘A Neo–Aristotelian Trinity: Phase One’) I 
situate the model of Monarchical Trinitarianism within the ontological 
framework as detailed in the previous section, where my discussion in this 
section will provide an answer to the multiple–natures problem. However, as we 
shall see, it will also generate a further problem, which I term the multiple–modes 
problem. Thus, in section 4 ('A Neo–Aristotelian Trinity: Phase Two') I respond 
to this second problem by explicating a further metaphysical thesis provided by 
Jonathan Lowe: serious essentialism, and apply it to the issue at hand. This will 
demonstrate that the multiple–modes problem, like the multiple–natures 
 
3 We can further understand the term to mean that each of the persons is extensively equal such 
that they possess numerically the same essential property of divinity. For a further explanation of 




problem, is not, in fact, a problem for a metaphysically robust version of 
Monarchical Trinitarianism. Finally, in the concluding section ('Conclusion') I 
will summarise the above results and conclude the article. 
 
1. Monarchical Trinitarianism and the Multiple–Natures Problem 
 
In contemporary analytic and historical theology, certain ‘models’ of the doctrine 
of the Trinity have been proposed which have their roots in Latin and Greek–
speaking pro–Nicene Trinitarianism. By a model, following Alvin Plantinga 
(2000), I mean a collection of propositions that shows how it could be so that 
another collection of target propositions are true or actual. In light of this, certain 
models of the doctrine of the Trinity seek to provide a possible means in which 
the doctrine could, in fact, be true.  In this case, we can focus on a specific model 
within Greek–speaking pro–Nicene  Trinitarianism: Monarchical Trinitarianism. 
This model of the Trinity has been most recently defended by John Behr (2004), 
in the historical theological literature, as well as by Beau Branson (n.d), 4 in the 
analytic theological literature.  
The following two conditions below are central to this specific model: 
 
According to Monarchical Trinitarianism, as expressed by (MT), the Father is the 
sole ultimate (unsourced) source of everything else and thus possesses a specific 
priority within the Trinity (and reality as a whole). This specific priority grounds 
the fact of the Father being designated as ‘God’ in the primary (i.e. nominal) sense 
of the word. That is, the Father is numerically identical to the one God. Whilst 
the Son and the Spirit are each, with the Father, ‘God’ in a secondary (i.e. 
predicative) sense of the word (by each of them sharing in the one divine nature). 
Therefore, this specific view of the Trinity posits the existence of three entities: 
the Father, the Son and the Spirit, who are each ‘God’ in the secondary 
(predicative) sense. Yet, there is only one ‘God’ within the Trinity, as only one of 
those entities: the Father, is 'God' in the primary (nominal) sense of the word. 
 
4 Branson (n.d.) introduces the term Monarchical Trinitarianism into the literature and is 
helpful in highlighting the historical foundations of the model and the neglect that it has faced in 
contemporary analytic theology. 
5 The terminology of 'predicative' and 'nominal' used in expressing the Monarchical 
Trinitarian position is original to this article.    
(MT) (a)  There are three entities within the Trinity: the Father, the Son and the Spirit, 
each of whom share one divine nature and thus are each equally termed ‘God’ 
(in the predicative sense). 
(b) The one ‘God’ (in the nominal sense) is numerically identical to one of the 
entities: the Father, who is the sole ultimate source of the Son and the Spirit.5 
 




This model of the doctrine of the Trinity clearly secures monotheism (which is a 
central aim of any model of the doctrine),6 through equivocating on the usage of 
the word ‘God’. As, on the one hand, it is used as a predicate in reference to each 
of the entities who possess the one divine nature. Yet, on the other hand, it is also 
used as a name which solely designates the Father, who is thus taken to be 
numerically identical to the one ‘God’. 
However, despite the model’s benefits, important questions can be raised 
concerning the metaphysical commitments that the model requires one to make. 
That is, one can ask certain questions concerning the ontological category that the 
entities within the Trinity fall under. Are they, for example, ‘Barthian modes’,7 
‘Leftovian lifestreams’,8 or 'persons' (in the modern sense of the word)? And what 
is the nature of the relation that ties each of these entities to the one divine nature 
enabling them to each be equally called 'God' (in the secondary/predicative sense 
of the word)? Is it a relation of instantiation, identity or exemplification? As it 
stands, answers to these questions have not been forthcoming from the adherents 
of Monarchical Trinitarianism, and thus this approach seems to provide a model 
of the doctrine of the Trinity that is, unfortunately, underdeveloped at a 
metaphysical level —let us call this problem the underdevelopment problem. 9 Yet, 
if Monarchical Trinitarianism is to serve as a helpful means of showing how it 
could be so that the collection of target propositions concerning the doctrine of 
the Trinity are true or actual—namely, it is a successful model of the doctrine of 
the Trinity—it will indeed be important to investigate the means in question to 
deal with this problem.  
Now, a potential way to do this, without requiring one to abandon the model 
as a whole, is through utilising certain elements of (a more popular) type of 
model which also resides within Greek–speaking pro–Nicene Trinitarianism: 
Social Trinitarianism. 10 Social Trinitarianism, which has recently been 
championed by a number of analytic theologians and philosophers such as 
 
6 For an explanation of the importance of a model of the doctrine of the Trinity securing 
monotheism for scriptural and historical reasons, see: (Tuggy, 2003). 
7 For Karl Barth, God is a unitary entity, where each of the hypostases is to be identified as a 
mode or way of being (seinsweise) of this entity. For an explanation of this, see: (CD I/2:359). 
8 For Brian Leftow, God lives his life through three simultaneous streams, where each of the 
hypostases are identified as event–based Lockean ‘persons’ that are founded upon a particular 
stream. For an explanation of this, see: (Leftow, 2004, 2007). 
9 However, Branson (n.d.) does begin to sketch out a metaphysical framework for this type of 
model. Yet, he does not focus on answering these important questions. One of the core aims of 
this article is thus to build on the work of Branson’s more historically focused piece by providing 
answers to these important metaphysical questions. 
10 The traditional view of Social Trinitarianism’s roots harkening back to the Trinitarian models 
of the Cappadocian Fathers has been recently contested by various theologians, for an explanation 




Cornelius Plantinga (1988), William Hasker (2013), William Lane Craig (2003), 
Edward Wierenga (2004) and Stephen T. Davies (2006), ultimately finds its 
paradigm formulation in the work of Richard Swinburne (1994) and (2018).11 This 
paradigm formulation posits the following two conditions as central to this type 
of model: 
 
Social Trinitarianism, as expressed by (ST), postulates, in a similar manner to 
Monarchical Trinitarianism, the existence of three distinct entities: the Father, the 
Son and the Spirit. These entities, however, are to be identified as fully distinct 
persons in a modern sense of the term. More specifically, they are pure mental 
substances, which results in each of them possessing, firstly, their own mental life, 
secondly, a privileged access to this mental life, thirdly, a capacity to perform 
separate intentional actions and, fourthly, a ‘token distinct’ consciousness that is, 
however, ‘type identical’ (Swinburne, 2018). The three persons are thus, as 
Swinburne writes: “distinct centres of knowledge, love, will and action” 
(Swinburne, 2018, 10). In addition to this, and more importantly, these persons 
are also divine entities, in the sense that each of them possesses the same nature—
the same essential, intrinsic property that is necessary and sufficient for being 
divine—the universal of essential, everlasting omnipotence.12 And the manner in 
which the persons are related to this essential intrinsic property is through a 
relation of instantiation, as Swinburne writes: 
 
a divine individual just is the instantiation of his properties…there is nothing 
more to a divine individual than the instantiation of the divine essence…it is 
exactly the instantiation of the same essence of divinity which makes the Father 
God, as makes the Son God, as makes the Spirit God. (Swinburne, 1994, 166, 189, 
emphasis added)  
 
11 Swinburne’s approach is a paradigm formulation of Social Trinitarianism due to it not 
(unlike Craig’s approach or Hasker’s approach) including within it certain ‘Latin’ elements (such 
as there being one soul or three ‘lifestreams’ within the Trinity) which can call into question the 
real  ‘personhood’ of the members of the Trinity. For the differences between these approaches, 
see: (Hasker, 2013, Ch.17, 18 and 23). 
12 According to Swinburne (2016, 174), the property of omnipotence entails the further 
properties of omniscience, omnipresence, perfect goodness etc. 
(ST) (a) There are three relationally distinct persons (i.e. pure mental substances) 
within Trinity: the Father, the Son and the Spirit, each of whom instantiates the 
one divine nature (i.e. the same essential, intrinsic property of everlasting 
omnipotence).  
(b) The one ‘God’ is numerically identical to the unified collective composed of 
the three divine persons. 
 




Thus, even though the Father, the Son and the Spirit are distinct persons, they all 
possess (i.e. instantiate), the same nature and thus are equally divine. In short, 
they are homoousios. And taking into account this sameness of nature, each of the 
persons is then solely to be individuated by their essential relational properties, 
where:  
 
(i) the relational property of the Father is that of ‘unbegottenness’ (i.e. being 
uncaused),  
(ii) the relational property of the Son is that of ‘begottenness’ (i.e. being caused 
to exist, by an uncaused divine person acting alone (i.e. the Father)), and 
(iii) the relational property of the Spirit is that of ‘spiritedness’ (i.e. being caused 
to exist by the uncaused divine person (i.e. the Father) and the divine person 
caused to exist by the uncaused divine person acting alone (i.e. the Son)).  
 
Therefore, the Father is individuated by not having any (inevitable) cause of his 
existence, whilst the Son and the Spirit are individuated by having an (inevitable) 
cause of their existence. Nonetheless, these causal relations indicate that the 
persons are (in some manner) existentially dependent upon each other. Specifically, 
this existential dependence is due to the causal relation that stems from the Father. 
Where the Father, due to his perfect goodness, would inevitably bring about the 
existence of the Son, and the Son likewise would inevitably co–operate with the 
Father in bringing about the Spirit. However, due to this ‘tripersonalisation’ 
being an inevitable act of the Father—which is an act of essence (or nature), rather 
than an act of will—the Trinitarian persons could not exist without each other.13  
Moreover, there is a further unity that ties them together: a unity of action, which 
wards off any possibility of volitional conflict between them.14 This unity of 
action is based on the fact that, due to their omniscience (which would provide 
them with knowledge of every true proposition, and no false beliefs), each of the 
 
13 One could ask the following question: “well, since the Father is said to be a cause of the Son, 
is it not the case then that prior to causing the Son, the Father must have existed on His own?” 
No. As Swinburne posits that to say that the Father (inevitably) caused the Son and the Spirit to 
exist is to say that the Father caused the Son and the Spirit to exist through a beginningless period 
of time. That is, any period, in which the Son and the Spirit exist, the Father, would have acted at 
an earlier instant to bring them about (Swinburne, 1994). There was thus not a time in which the 
Son and the Spirit did not exist, and the Father existed alone. As for every period of beginningless 
time that one proceeds back to, there is an earlier moment in which the Father caused the Son and 
the Spirit to exist. According to Swinburne, there is thus never an instant in which the Son and 
the Spirit do not exist. 
14 This volitional conflict is known as the problem of omnipotence, which Swinburne (1994) 
took as his starting point for constructing his Social Trinitarian model. The potential issue 
presented by this problem is that of a possible failure of volitions (i.e. a ‘clash’ of wills) between 
two (or more) omnipotent beings, showing that there logically cannot be more than one divine 




persons would understand that at any given point of time there are different 
spheres of activity that they would be morally required to operate within. Given 
their possession of this knowledge concerning which sphere they are to operate 
within and their perfect goodness (requiring them not to perform any morally 
bad action), they would each believe that it would be bad for them to perform a 
non–cooperative action outside of their sphere of activity, and thus desire not to 
do so (Swinburne, 2008).  However, it is the Father, through his initial primacy 
(i.e. him being the ultimate source of the two other divine persons),15 who would 
have the authority to establish these distinct spheres of activity for each of the 
Trinitarian persons to operate within. Thus, each of the persons being omniscient 
and perfectly good, they would therefore co–operate with each other and back 
the actions of the other persons within their own sphere of activity. Therefore, 
there is a volitional interdependence between the three divine persons. Accordingly, 
this unity of being, as well as action, enables the Trinitarian persons to be an 
interdependent collective that ‘functions’ as a totally unified society that is 
‘rightly’ designated with the name ‘God’.  
Thus, we see that Social Trinitarianism (in its paradigm formulation) posits the 
existence of three distinct divine persons, each of whom instantiates the same 
nature—the same essential, intrinsic property of everlasting omnipotence—
ultimately resulting in the persons being homoousios. They are existentially 
dependent, in that they rely upon each other for their continued existence. 
Moreover, they are volitionally interdependent, in that they co–operate together, 
within, and without, their designated spheres of activity. This all establishing a 
unified ‘collective’ termed ‘God’. Taking all of these things into account, we can 
now assume elements of the metaphysical model provided by Social 
Trinitarianism into that of the Monarchical Trinitarian framework detailed 
above.16 The ultimately enabling us to deal with the underdevelopment problem 
and provide a more ‘fine–grained’ construal of the two conditions of (MT) as 
such: 
 
15 This is still true despite the Father’s cooperation with the Son in bringing about the Spirit, as 
the Father is defined as the uncaused cause of all the other divine persons, and thus the Son’s 
causal role is simply that of the Father operating through him. That is, in their cooperative act, the 
Father is the ultimate source of the Spirit, and the Son is the means by which the Spirit exists. 
16 Importantly, however, this would not include the nominal use of the term ‘God’ in reference 
to the Trinity. This will be further explained below. 
(MT*) (S) There are three relationally distinct persons (i.e. pure mental substances) 
within Trinity: the Father, the Son and the Spirit, each of whom instantiates 
the one divine nature (i.e. the same essential, intrinsic property of 
everlasting omnipotence) and thus are each equally termed ‘God’ (in the 
predicative sense).  




Therefore, Monarchical Trinitarianism,17 construed in this more specific and 
metaphysically robust way (hereafter, Monarchical Trinitarianism*), has, 
through (M) of (MT*), a monarchical strand. Within this monarchical strand, the 
one God is numerically identical to the Father (rather than the Trinity, as found 
within the paradigm formulation of Social Trinitarianism (ST)).18 And, through 
(S) of (MT*), which is the extension made to the model, it also has a social strand. 
Within this social strand, each of the members of the Trinity is a person who 
individually instantiates the one divine nature (rather than them being undefined 
entities that are related to the one divine nature by an undefined relation, as was 
previously posited by Monarchical Trinitarianism (MT)).  We can thus illustrate 
the central aspects of Monarchical Trinitarianism* through the following diagram 
(with  'CR' standing for a 'causal relation', 'DN' standing for the 'divine nature', 
'Ins' standing for an 'instantiation relation', the 'dashed line' representing ‘the 
Son's mediation of the causation of the Spirit by the Father’ and the 'outer–circle' 
representing the Trinity (i.e. the unified collective composed of the Trinitarian 
persons): 
 
17 The starring of this name emphasises that the version of Monarchical Trinitarianism under 
discussion here is that of the metaphysically robust version expressed by the conditions of  (MT*) 
rather than (MT). Thus, whenever Monarchical Trinitarianism is unstarred, this will be in 
reference to the underdeveloped version expressed by (MT).  
18 The assumption of Social Trinitarianism into the framework of Monarchical Trinitarianism* 
does not only help to deal with an issue plaguing Monarchical Trinitarianism but also can help 
Social Trinitarianism face up to an issue concerning the plausibility of identifying the one God as 
the collective of divine persons. That is the plausibility of using the name 'God' for a collective 
entity. This does indeed seem implausible as ‘God’, used in this specific nominal sense within 
Christianity and the other Abrahamic religions (i.e. Judaism and Islam), is usually a term that 
solely designates a personal entity (which is evidenced in the holy scriptures of these religions by 
the usual replacement of this name with the personal pronoun 'He') rather than an impersonal 
collection of personal entities. It thus seems to be a stretch for one to secure monotheism in the 
manner that Social Trinitarianism has sought to do through using the term God in this specific 
way. By combining this model of the Trinity with Monarchical Trinitarianism, we can drop the 
identification made here and re–identify God as a personal entity: the Father. 
 
(M) The one ‘God’ (in the nominal sense) is numerically identical to one of 
















Figure 1.1 Monarchical Trinitarianism* 
 
The model of the Trinity that is proposed here secures monotheism, through its 
monarchical foundation, whilst warding off the underdevelopment issue that 
previously plagued it, through an assumption of some of the metaphysical 
elements that underpin Social Trinitarianism. However, despite the advantages 
of this proposal, an important question can be asked concerning the ‘orthodox 
credentials’ of this specific model.19 That is, as this formulation of Monarchical 
Trinitarianism* now includes within it a ‘social strand’ that utilises certain 
metaphysically robust notions such as personhood and instantiation, one can 
now ask if these metaphysical additions render the notion of Monarchical 
Trinitarianism as ‘unorthodox’?  
Focusing our attention on the second robust notion,20 that of the instantiation 
relation, a more specific question becomes: how many ‘natures’ are there in this 
construal of the doctrine of the Trinity? Is there actually only one homoousios 
nature that is shared between each of the Trinitarian persons (as expressed in the 
historical creeds of Nicaea (325 CE) and Constantinople (381 CE)), or not? An 
adherent of Monarchical Trinitarianism* would plausibly answer this question 
in the affirmative and state that there is solely one nature, as the persons each 
instantiate the same universal of divinity (hereafter, divinity–attribute), which 
renders them each as ‘God’ (in the predicative sense). However, one can surely 
ask why this ‘sameness’ is simply not that of each of the persons instantiating a 
particular attribute of the same type, rather than there being a single instance of this 
attribute (which pro–Nicene Trinitarianism seems to require)? Our hypothetical 
adherent of Monarchical Trinitarianism* would, again, plausibly affirm that the 
attributes have a sameness in type over that of instance and thus agree that there 
seems to be a multiplicity of particular instances of the divinity–attribute present 
 
19 With the standard of orthodoxy here being that of pro–Nicene Trinitarianism. 
20 For a defense of the ‘orthodoxy’ of the first robust notion, which is that of the members of 
the Trinity being persons in the modern sense, see: (Hasker, 2013, 19–49). 




within the Trinity. The three divine persons thus fall under the same kind, 
thereby each individually instantiating the divinity–attribute. However, an 
adherent of Monarchical Trinitarianism* can themselves now ask the question of 
why construing the model as an instantiation–based position through its social 
strand, which results in there being a multiplicity of instances within the Trinity, 
is indeed problematic?  
In answering this type of question, Timothy Pawl (2020, 12) has given an 
interesting parity example, which he states as follows: 
 
When my daughters, Mary, Beatrice, Edith, and Agnes, each instantiate the 
universal, Humanity, and each has proper characteristics such that we don’t 
confuse them, what we have there are four humans, not a single human. 
 
In other words, when we count human people, we count by individual instances 
of humanity. Thus, if there are a multiplicity of instances of humanity, then there 
are multiple humanity–attributes (i.e. humanity natures). The Trinitarian 
persons, in a similar manner, can be taken as individual instances of a specific 
universal (i.e. the divinity–attribute). However, understood in this way, it does 
not seem as if there is only one divinity–attribute (i.e. one nature) within the 
Trinity, which is surely problematic. More specifically, if we posit the existence 
of an instantiation relation between the Trinitarian persons and the divinity–
attribute, then it seems that when we are counting the number of attributes 
within the Trinity, we are also to count by individual instances of that specific 
universal. Since there are three instances of this divinity–attribute, each of the 
Father, the Son and the Spirit, we can take there to be three particular natures (i.e. 
attributes) within the Trinity. Therefore, taking this issue into account, instead of 
Monarchical Trinitarianism* solely positing one nature—a numerically singular 
divinity–attribute—it appears to allow a proliferation of particular natures that 
correspond to the number of instances within the Trinitarian life. And, given that 
there are three divine persons, this leads to there being three particular natures 
within the Trinity. This postulation of an instantiation relation between the 
Trinitarian persons and the divinity–attribute thus seems to be highly 
problematic in securing the homoousion between the Trinitarian persons, as each 
of the persons has their own particular nature, rather than being of the same, 
numerically identical nature (attribute). Thus, as Pawl (2020, 12) notes, such 
approaches, seem to have ‘given up’ on monotheism. That is, even though 
Monarchical Trinitarianism* seemingly secured monotheism through its 
equivocation in the use of the word ‘God’, it seems to have lost a hold of it in 
another respect—namely, this approach fails to capture the ontological unity of 
the persons of the Trinity, through further metaphysical considerations. 




Monarchical Trinitarianism, which utilised elements of Social Trinitarianism, it 
seems as if we have swapped one problem, the underdevelopment problem, for 
an even more serious problem, the multiple–natures problem. The question now 
becomes: is there any way to deal with this specific problem? I believe that there 
is, by providing a further ontological and metaphysical precisification of this 
model. This precisification task will focus on situating Monarchical 
Trinitarianism* within a specific ontological framework developed by Jonathan 
Lowe, which provides an alternative relationship between the Trinitarian 
persons and the divine nature (i.e. the Person–Nature relation). This will 
ultimately result in there being no multiple–natures within the Trinity. To this 
task, we now turn. 
 
2. A Neo–Aristotelian Ontology 
 
Jonathan Lowe (2006, 2009 and 2012a,b) has developed a formal, neo–Aristotelian 
categorial ontology, termed the four–category ontology,21 which aims to provide a 
metaphysical foundation for the natural sciences. Within this ontological 
framework, Lowe posits the existence of four, cross–categorial, fundamental 
ontological categories. These four fundamental categories are constituted by 
drawing together the substance/property dichotomy with the 
universal/particular dichotomy.22 According to Lowe (2006), these two 
distinctions cut across one another, ultimately producing the four fundamental 
ontological categories of: 
 
(1) objects (substances), (2) modes (property–instances), (3) kinds (substantial 
universals) and (4) attributes (non–substantial universals) 
 
which are individuated by the three ontological dependence relations of: 
 
 
21 This ontology is neo–Aristotelian as it finds its roots in Aristotle’s ontological categorisation 
in his work Categories. Furthermore, this ontology is situated within the branch of analytic 
metaphysics called formal ontology. Formal ontology focuses on identifying the fundamental 
ontological categories and the formal relations that obtain between members of those different 
categories (Lowe, 2006). 
22 Within this ontological framework particulars specifically instantiate universals but do not 
have instances. Whilst universals are instantiable entities. Furthermore, universals and particulars 
are themselves not categories, but act as transcategorial entities, which, according to Lowe, are 
“not more fundamental than those of the third level [the four categories] because they are mere 
abstractions and do no serious ontological work on their own account” (Lowe, 2006, 39, square 
parenthesis added). The four categories are thus the most basic categories within this ontological 
framework. 




(5) rigid existential dependence, (6) non–rigid existential dependence and (7) 
identity–dependence 
 
and are related to each other by the three formal ontological relations of: 
 
(8) instantiation, (9) characterisation and (10) exemplification.  
 
The four fundamental categories of (1)–(4) are thus defined in terms of the 
ontological dependence relations (i.e. dependence profiles) of (5)–(7) and the 
formal ontological relations of (8)–(10), with the four categories and formal 
ontological relations being helpfully represented through a diagram, which has 
been termed by Lowe (2006) and others, the Ontological Square.23 This diagram 




   
 
 







The defining features of the four fundamental categories are thus as follows: 
firstly, particular (substantial) objects are property–bearing particulars that have 
determinate existence and identity conditions. They are countable entities and 
are not themselves borne or possessed by anything else.24 Furthermore, particular 
objects are characterised by modes and, more importantly, they are instances of 
kinds. They are rigidly existentially dependent upon these kinds, where the term 
‘rigid’ used here indicates a lack of flexibility in this dependence relation. That is, 
the existence of an entity (a given x) requires the existence of another specific 
entity (a given y) (Tahko and Lowe, 2015). The dependence of x upon y, in this 
form of ontological dependence, is thus a strict implication, mainly x’s existence 
strictly implying y’s existence. Thus, within this context, it is necessary that a 
particular object’s existence is dependent upon the existence of that specific kind. 
 
23 With the ontological dependence relations (i.e. dependence profiles) being included within 
the categories of the Ontological Square. 
24 For a further helpful explanation of the conditions of objecthood, see: (Lowe, 1998, Ch.2). 




Secondly, kinds (or substantial universals) are universals that are (secondary) 
objects and kinds of being.25 Kinds thus have their membership determined by 
certain distinctive existence and identity conditions, which can be determined a 
priori.26 Additionally, kinds can be construed as forms (in a hylomorphic sense) 
that constitute the essence or very identity of a member of that kind (i.e. what it 
is to be a member of that kind).27 The particular instances of a given kind are thus 
(identical to) particular forms and, more specifically, these instances are particular 
objects which the kind is non–rigidly existentially dependent upon. The term 
‘non–rigid’, in contradistinction to rigid existential dependence, is instead used 
here to express flexibility in this dependence relation, in that the existence of x, 
does not require the existence of a specific entity, but only an entity that possesses 
characteristics of a certain class (Fs). That is, this dependence relation only 
requires simply that at least some Fs exist, rather than with the rigid requirement 
of a specific object existing. Therefore, within this context, it is necessary that a 
kind’s existence is dependent upon the existence of some instance of that kind. In 
addition to this, kinds are also characterised by attributes, which they depend 
upon for their identity This specific notion of identity–dependence, as noted by 
Lowe, centres around the fact that “the identity of x depends on the identity of y 
—or, more briefly, that x depends for its identity upon y—is to say that which 
thing of its kind y is fixes (or metaphysically determines) which thing of its kind 
x is” (Lowe, 1998, 147, emphasis added). In this context, it is thus of the essence of 
the kind in question to derive its identity from the specific attributes that 
characterise it. 
Thirdly, attributes (or non–substantial universals/properties) are universal 
ways of being of a given entity. Specifically, attributes function as characterising 
property universals. Any given two entities can thus be qualitatively the same 
whilst being numerically distinct.  Attributes have modes as their instances, 
rather than particular objects, and are non–rigidly existentially dependent upon 
the category of kinds (which they also characterise). It is thus important to note 
that this specific ontological framework is a version of immanent realism, 
according to which there exist no un–instantiated attributes (i.e. universals). 
 
25 Lowe (2006) makes a distinction within this ontology between 'first' or 'particular' objects 
and ‘secondary’ objects—identified as kinds—given that both types of entities fulfil the 
requirements of objecthood (i.e. are property–bearers, have determinate existence and identity 
conditions, are countable and are not themselves borne by any other entities).  
26 The a priori determination of these conditions distinguishes a kind of being from a natural 
kind, which would have the conditions for its membership determined a posteriori (Lowe 2006).  
27 More on the nature of an essence below. Furthermore, Lowe (1998 and 2012a) puts forward 
an original interpretation of the Aristotelian thesis of hylomorphism, by taking a form to be a 
universal (i.e. a substantial universal/kind) and de–ontologises the category of matter. Entities are 
thus not a combination of matter and form but solely are identified as particularised forms.  




Therefore, it is an essential feature of any attribute that it has particular instances 
which ground its existence. 
Fourthly, and finally, modes (or property–instances) are particular ways of 
being of a given entity. Specifically, modes function as particular ways in which a 
given particular object may be a certain thing. Any given two entities can thus be 
qualitatively similar whilst being numerically distinct. Modes are instances of 
attributes, upon which they are rigidly existentially dependent, and they serve 
the role of characterising objects, upon which they are also identity and rigidly 
existentially dependent. 
These four fundamental ontological categories of objects, kinds, attributes and 
modes, are related by (and are partly defined in terms of) the asymmetrical 
formal ontological relations of characterisation, instantiation and 
exemplification.28 These ontological relations, according to Lowe (2006), are 
irreducible and primitive notions. The implication here is that we cannot provide a 
reductive analysis or definition of their nature.29 Yet, we can still draw certain 
distinctions between them. Firstly, characterisation, which is traditionally termed 
‘inherence’, is a relationship that takes the characterising entities (i.e. modes and 
attributes) not as constituents (or parts of) the entities they characterise (i.e. 
objects and kinds), but as ‘characteristics’, ‘features’ or ‘aspects’ of these entities. 
For example, a redness–attribute characterises the kind Tomato, and thus the 
colour ‘redness’ is to be taken as a ‘characteristic’, ‘feature’ or ‘aspect’ of the kind 
Tomato. Additionally, a redness–mode, which is an instance of a redness–
attribute, characterises a particular tomato, and thus the colour ‘redness’ is a 
particular ‘characteristic’, ‘feature’ or ‘aspect’ of that tomato.  
Secondly, instantiation is a relationship between a particular entity and a 
universal. However, the particular entities (i.e. objects and modes) are again not 
to be taken as constituents of universals (i.e. kinds and attributes), but simply are 
particular instances of them. That is, a particular tomato is to be taken as an 
instance of the kind Tomato.  
Thirdly, exemplification is a relationship between an object and an attribute. 
Exemplification, however, is not a primitive formal ontological relation but is 
instead an indirect relationship between an object and an attribute. It is non–
primitive (and non–direct) given that it is a resultant relationship derivable from 
 
28 These asymmetrical formal ontological relations play a role in defining the entities within 
the four fundamental categories; however, this is only a partial role, due to this defining role 
being shared with the various dependence relations. 
29 Furthermore, these asymmetrical formal ontological relations are construed as ‘internal 
relations’, in that they are necessitated by the existence of the entities that they relate, and thus, 
because of this, they are ‘no addition of being’. Lowe thus sees that these formal and ontological 
relations are to be more accurately taken as ‘relationships’ rather than relations. For a further 




the two other formal ontological relations of instantiation and characterisation. 
These formal ontological relations are species of the relationship of 
exemplification which provide two fundamentally different ways in which a 
particular object can be indirectly related to an attribute. That is, either the 
particular object exemplifies an attribute through instantiating a kind which, in 
turn, is characterised by the attribute or, the object exemplifies an attribute 
through being characterised by a mode which, in turn, instantiates the attribute 
itself. For example, a particular tomato exemplifies a redness–attribute by either 
instantiating the kind Tomato, which is itself characterised by a redness–attribute 
or, by being characterised by a redness–mode, which is an instance of the same 
redness–attribute. 
Furthermore, these two distinct species of exemplification, according to Lowe 
(2009), obtain in two different varieties, modes or manners, which are termed 
‘dispositional exemplification’ and ‘occurrent exemplification’. However, for 
Lowe, the distinction between the dispositional and the occurrent does not 
represent a distinction between two different types of properties.30 Rather the 
distinction is between dispositional and occurrent predication, relations and state 
of affairs. Thus, the four–category ontology disposes with dispositional and 
occurrent properties and instead describes things at three levels: 
 
(State of Affairs Level): Dispositional & occurrent state of affairs 
(Relational Level): Dispositional & occurrent exemplification 
(Linguistic Level): Dispositional & occurrent predication. 
 
In light of these three levels, a dispositional state of affairs is one in which a 
particular object instantiates a kind. This is in turn characterised by an attribute, 
resulting in the object dispositionally exemplifying that attribute.31 This then can 
be expressed linguistically through dispositional predication, which is stated 
formally as such (with ‘Dis[a, F]’ standing for ‘a exemplifies attribute F 
dispositionally’ ‘/’ standing for instantiation, and a juxtaposition of the constants 
or variables (e.g. ‘βG’), representing ‘characterisation’:  
 
(Dispositional): Dis[a, F] =df. (∃ϕ)(ϕF & a/ϕ). (Lowe, 2009, 178) 
 
Whereas an occurrent state of affairs is one in which a particular object is 
characterised by a mode which, in turn, instantiates an attribute, resulting in the 
 
30 The majority of metaphysicians favour the term ‘categorical’ rather than ‘occurrent’ for 
properties that are not dispositional. However, Lowe sees this term as being metaphysically 
loaded, and so prefers the latter. 
31 Thus, a state of affairs here is simply the indirect ‘possession’ of a property (attribute) by an 
object. 




particular object occurrently exemplifying that attribute. This then can also be 
expressed linguistically through occurrent predication, which is stated formally 
as such (with ‘Occ[a, F]’ standing for ‘a exemplifies attribute F occurrently’, ‘r’ 
standing for ‘mode’): 
 
(Occurrent): Occ[a, F] =df. (∃r)(ar & r/F). (Lowe, 2009, 178) 
 
Particular objects can thus exemplify a given attribute in either of these two ways: 
dispositionally or occurrently, which is thus the obtaining of either a 
dispositional or occurrent state of affairs, that is expressed, linguistically, through 
dispositional or occurrent predication. For example, a particular tomato 
dispositionally exemplifies a redness–attribute through it being an instance of the 
kind Tomato which is, in turn, characterised by a redness–attribute.32 However, 
a particular tomato occurrently exemplifies a redness–attribute by it being 
characterised by a redness–mode which is, in turn, an instance of a redness–
attribute.33 We can further illustrate this dispositional/occurrent distinction 
through another version of the Ontological Square which can be illustrated as 













Given this, there is thus a distinction between dispositional and occurrent 
states/relations/predicates that ground the exemplification of an attribute by a 
particular object.  
Within the ontological framework of the four–category ontology, there are 
thus four fundamental ontological categories: objects, kinds, attributes and 
 
32 In a predicative sense, one would communicate this state of affairs by simply saying that 
'the tomato is red’, which in the above schema, is: Dis[t, R] where ‘t’ stands for tomato and ‘R’ for 
the attribute of redness.  
33 In a predicative sense, one would communicate this state of affairs by simply saying that 
'the tomato is redding’, which in the above schema, is: Occ[t, R] where ‘t’ again stands for tomato 
and ‘R’ for the attribute of redness.  




modes. These are defined by three ontological dependence relations: rigid 
existential dependence, non–rigid existential dependence and identity–
dependence. And these categories are related to each other by three fundamental 
formal ontological relations: instantiation, characterisation and exemplification. 
The four–category ontology thus provides a clear ontological framework for 
assessing the nature and relationships of various types of entities. We will now 
turn our attention to utilising this framework within a Trinitarian context, which 
will ultimately help us to further elucidate the relationship between the 
Trinitarian persons and the one divine nature. 
  
3. A Neo–Aristotelian Trinity: Phase–One 
 
According to Monarchical Trinitarianism*, as noted earlier, there are three divine 
entities within the Trinity: the Father the Son, and the Spirit. However, we can 
now re–construe the nature of these entities within the ontological framework of 
the four–category ontology. We do this by stating that the Father, the Son and the 
Spirit are particular objects by each of them, firstly, being property bearers (i.e. 
each bearing the attribute of divinity) with determinate existence and identity 
conditions, and, secondly, through each them not being borne or possessed by 
any other entity. In light of the ‘social strand’ of Monarchical Trinitarianism*, we 
can also further construe these particular objects as being of a 'pure mental' 
nature, rather than a 'pure physical' nature. This means that they are each a 'pure 
mental' particular object—they are persons in a modern sense.  
Focusing now on the divinity of each of the Trinitarian persons, we can also 
state that as particular objects, the Father, the Son and the Spirit, each necessarily 
instantiate a kind (or form), which we can term Deity. This kind (i.e. a kind of 
being) has its membership determined by certain distinctive existence and 
identity conditions that are determinable a priori.34 The Father, the Son and the 
Spirit are thus each necessarily deity–instances (or particularised deity–forms).35 The 
kind Deity is non–rigidly existentially dependent upon the existence of at least 
one of the Trinitarian persons existing—it is necessary that the kind Deity exists 
only if at least, for example, the Father exists. And each of the Trinitarian persons 
is rigidly existentially dependent upon the existence of the kind Deity—each of 
the Trinitarian persons necessarily exists only if the kind Deity exists. Now, 
Deity, as a kind, would be characterised by an attribute, which we can term the 
divinity–attribute. The divinity–attribute—everlasting omnipotence—would be 
 
34 These conditions could plausibly be that of existing everlastingly and being identified as an 
object that is unlimited in power. 
35 This fits nicely with Swinburne’s (2016, 249–250) position that a divine person is a form. For 
brevity, however, I will no longer mention, but simply assume the further qualification that a kind 
is a form and that instances of kinds are particularised forms. 




an essential ‘feature’, ‘characteristic’ or ‘aspect’ of the kind Deity. That is, it would 
be (in some sense) ‘possessed’ by it or ‘inhere’ within it. Thus, every entity within 
the kind Deity, that is every deity–instance, would simply be divine (i.e. 
essentially, everlastingly omnipotent).  
Assuming immanent realism, the divinity–attribute as a (non–substantial) 
universal would be instantiated by at least one mode, which we can term a 
divinity–mode. And as a particular instance of the divinity–attribute, the existence 
of a divinity–mode would be rigidly existentially dependent upon the existence 
of the divinity–attribute—a divinity–mode necessarily exists only if the divinity–
attribute exists. Conversely, the existence of the divinity–attribute would be non–
rigidly existentially dependent on the existence of the divinity–mode—the 
divinity–attribute necessarily exists only if at least one divinity–mode exists as 
well.  Additionally, a divinity–mode, as with all types of modes, would be a 
particular way a being is—a particular way in which its bearer would be 
characterised. Thus, a divinity–mode would exist as an entity that characterises 
its bearer by bestowing upon it a certain character, that of being divine (i.e. 
essentially, everlastingly omnipotent). Thus, the Father, the Son and the Spirit, as 
particular objects, are each characterised by a particular divinity–mode. That is, 
each of these divinity–modes exists as an essential feature, characteristic or aspect 
of the Father, the Son and the Spirit. Specifically, divinity–modes directly bestow 
the character of divinity onto each of the Trinitarian persons, resulting in each of 
the persons being a particular divine person. Moreover, each of these divinity–
modes would be identity–dependent on their bearer—it is part of the essence of a 
given divinity–mode to be the mode that it is (i.e. the mode of that specific bearer) 
in virtue of its relation to the Trinitarian person that it characterises.  
Lastly, in this reconfiguration of Monarchical Trinitarianism* within the four–
category ontology, the Father, the Son and the Spirit are taken to be in an indirect 
relationship of exemplification to the divinity–attribute—the divinity–attribute is 
(dispositionally and occurrently) exemplified by the Father, the Son and the 
Spirit. Firstly, the Father, the Son and the Spirit each dispositionally exemplify the 
divinity–attribute through instantiating the kind Deity which is, in turn, 
characterised by the divinity–attribute. Secondly, the Father, the Son and the 
Spirit each also occurrently exemplify the divinity–attribute through each of them 
being characterised by a divinity–mode that, in turn, instantiates the divinity–
attribute. Thus, taking the Father as an example, we can now re–construe the 
















Based on this categorisation of the Trinitarian persons, we can deal with the 
multiple–natures problem as such: at a ‘coarse–grained’ level, we take the 
homoousios of the persons to be defined as follows: 
 
(H) the Father, the Son and the Spirit are homoousios =df. the Father, the Son 
and the Spirit each possess the one divine nature. 
 
However, in modifying the ‘social strand’ of Monarchical Trinitarianism*, we can 
now posit that, rather than the relation of ‘possession’ in (H) being that of an 
instantiation relation, it is instead an exemplification relation,36 which enables us to 
reconstrue (H) as such: 
 
(H*) the Father, the Son and the Spirit are homoousios =df. the Father, the Son and 
the Spirit each exemplify the one divinity–attribute. 
 
Unlike the direct relationship of instantiation that featured in the original 
construal of the ‘social strand’ of Monarchical Trinitarianism*, the indirect 
relationship of exemplification that features in (H*) does not negate the fact that 
there is only one nature within the Trinity. This is because, in a direct instantiation 
relationship, where the Trinitarian persons instantiate the one divinity–attribute, 
there would plausibly be three particular instantiations of this attribute: one 
particular instantiation for the Father, one for the Son and one for the Spirit. Yet, 
as the Trinitarian persons possess their own particular instance of the divinity–
attribute, it is difficult to see how they do, in fact, possess one divine nature (i.e. 
are homoousios). Rather, it seems to be quite clear that there are three (particular) 
divine natures within the Trinity.  
However, by utilising the four–category ontology, specifically that of the 
categories of substantial kinds and non–substantial attributes, and the indirect 
 
36 Where ‘x possesses F’ is, at a more ‘fine–grained’ level, restated as ‘x exemplifies F’—with F 
being the one divinity–attribute. 
Figure 1.4 Ontological Square (Trinitarian Version 1)  




relationship of exemplification, one can take there to be only one divine nature 
that is ‘possessed’ by each of the persons. This is due to the fact that within this 
framework there is only one divinity–attribute that is required to perform the 
role of characterising the kind Deity, which then itself, rather than the attribute, 
has multiple instantiations. Specifically, it is the kind Deity, rather than the 
divinity–attribute, that has particular objects as instances and is thus in a direct 
relationship to the persons of the Trinity. And, as there is one kind posited here 
(i.e. the kind Deity), plausibly there is only one divinity–attribute characterising 
that kind, which the persons are then, as instances of that kind, indirectly related 
to. Thus, rather than having three instances of the divinity–attribute, which 
would result in there being three (particular) natures within the Trinitarian life, 
we instead have three instances of the kind Deity. And as the kind Deity is 
characterised by the one divinity–attribute, we can plausibly count only one 
universal (propertied or attributive) nature that is equally shared by each of the 
persons of the Trinity. Thus, the persons are homoousios, that is they possess one 
divine nature, through their exemplification of it. There is thus no multiple–
natures problem plaguing this construal of Monarchical Trinitarianism*.  
However, there does seem to be a potentially problematic element of the 
ontological framework that has not been taken into account in our subsequent 
discussion of (H*), which is that of the Trinitarian persons’ occurrent 
exemplification of the divinity–attribute. That is, focusing again on the 
Ontological Square, we seem to have only described a dispositional movement 
around the Square (i.e. an instantiation of a kind that is characterised by an 
attribute), rather than an occurrent movement around it (i.e. a characterisation by 














The reason why this occurrent exemplification of the divinity–attribute appears 
to be problematic is due to the fact that this type of exemplification seemingly 
saddles us with the same problem that we started off with—it appears to be the 




case that we still have multiple instantiations of the divinity–attribute. According 
to our categorisation within the four–category ontology above, the Trinitarian 
persons do not only dispositionally exemplify the divinity–attribute but also 
occurrently exemplify it by each of them being characterised by a divinity–mode. 
That is: 
 
(iv) The Father is characterised by divinity–mode d1 
(v) The Son is characterised by divinity–mode d2 
(vi) The Spirit is characterised by divinity–mode d3 
 
with d1–d3 themselves being instances of the divinity–attribute. Thus, in counting 
instances, we again have three particular instances of the divinity–attribute, 
which results in there being three particular natures within the Trinity. 
Categorising the Trinity within Lowe’s ontological framework as we have done 
above seems to provide us with what we want: the possession of one divine 
nature, which it does through the dispositional ‘aspect’ of exemplification. 
However, if taken in another way, it also saddles us with what we don’t want: 
three instances of the divinity–attribute, which it does through the occurrent 
‘aspect’ of exemplification. So, we can now call this problematic dilemma 
presented to us here the multiple–modes problem, which is another version of the 
multiple–natures problem.37 The question that remains is whether there is, in fact, 
a way out of this problem?  
Well, one potential way out of this problem would be to simply negate the 
occurrent exemplification of the divinity–attribute by each of the Trinitarian 
persons. This would result in there being zero divinity–modes that individually 
characterise the persons of the Trinity, and thus there would not be multiple 
divinity–modes within the Trinitarian life. Yet, even though this is indeed a quick 
and easy way to deal with the problem, we cannot pursue this path, given that 
the four–category ontology is an immanent realist ontology. Thus, a divinity–
mode must exist, in order for the divinity–attribute itself to exist.38 Therefore, a 
different path out of this dilemma must be sought. This different path, which will 
be explored below, is that of focusing more intently on the ‘monarchical strand’ of 
Monarchical Trinitarianism*, which centres around the priority of the Father. 
That is, given that the Father is (ontologically) prior to the Son and the Spirit (as 
their ultimate source), the Son and Spirit derive their nature from the Father. It is 
by the Father communicating his divinity to the Son and the Spirit, which renders 
them as divine. Thus, the divinity of the Son and the Spirit is that of the Father's, 
 
37 Why it is classed as another version of this problem is due to the fact that there still seems 
to be multiple natures in the form of multiple modes (of divinity) within the Trinity, which 
burdens us with the same issue as before.  
38 Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this objection. 




which he possesses in the here and now. In other words, the Father possesses his 
divinity occurrently, which is clearly evident, due to the fact that if the Father did 
not possess his divinity in this manner, then he would not be able to give it, in the 
here and now, to the Son and the Spirit. Thus, the occurrent possession of divinity 
is necessary for the Father fulfilling his role of being the ultimate source of the 
Son and the Spirit within the Trinity. Yet, it is not a necessary requirement for the 
Son and the Spirit to also possess this divinity in the exact same way, given that 
they do not fulfil the role of being the ultimate source within the Trinity. 
Taking this into account within the ontological framework provided by Lowe, 
we can therefore negate the (absolute or, at least, direct) occurrent exemplification 
of the divinity–attribute by the Son and the Spirit,39 and solely maintain, firstly, 
the (absolute and direct) occurrent exemplification of the divinity–attribute by 
the Father alone and,  secondly, the dispositional (or indirect occurrent) 
exemplification of this attribute by the other Trinitarian persons. This results in 
there being one divinity–mode and instantiation of the divinity–attribute within 
the Trinity, which is that of the Father’s. Importantly, however, the Son and the 
Spirit are also able to remain homoousios with the Father through being 
dispositionally (or (indirectly) occurrently) related to the divinity–attribute. In 
light of such considerations, we can conclude that the multiple–modes problem, 
like the multiple–natures problem, also fails to provide us with a real issue for 
our metaphysical elucidation of Monarchical Trinitarianism*. It is important to 
note, however, that this way of dealing with the multiple–modes problem is not 
an ad hoc move created to save this model of the Trinity from falsification. As 
questions can indeed be raised concerning the accuracy of our previous 
categorisation of the persons of the Trinity within the four–category ontology, 
where we assumed that the persons are, in fact, particular objects that are each 
directly and properly characterised by divinity–modes. We will now explore some 
solutions for these questions within Lowe's neo–Aristotelian metaphysical 
framework of serious essentialism, which will further help us in our task of dealing 
with the multiple–modes problem.40 
 
4. A Neo–Aristotelian Trinity: Phase–Two 
 
Essentialism is the metaphysical view that holds to a certain range of entities 
being meaningfully said to have essences and/or essential features. According to 
 
39 Absolute occurrent exemplification in the sense of an entity bearing this relation. Direct and 
indirect occurrent exemplification in the sense of an entity bearing this relation in a non–mediated 
or mediated manner. This will be further explained below. 
40 The term ‘serious essentialism’ will be used frequently as a placeholder name for Lowe’s 





Lowe (2008), essentialism comes in two different forms: serious essentialism and 
ersatz essentialism. The ersatz form of essentialism, which is the more prevalent 
form found within contemporary thought, seeks to provide a modal 
characterisation of the notion of essence and has been defended by various 
‘possible world’ theorists.41 In elucidating this modal characterisation of 
essentialism, these possible world theorists take the essence of an entity to be 
composed of the essential properties of that entity—the properties that the entity 
must possess in every possible world (in which it exists), or alternatively, 
properties that must be possessed by 'counterparts' of that entity in every 
possible world (in which that entity has counterparts) (Lowe, 2008). Additionally, 
these theorists typically claim that some, but not all of the entity's actual 
properties are essential to it in this sense—with the other properties possessed by 
the entity being non–essential properties (Lowe, 2008). Yet, despite the 
prevalence of this view, Lowe (2008, 34) takes this type of essentialism to be an 
unserious form of essentialism due to the fact that it, amongst other things,42 
attempts to ‘characterise essence in terms of antecedently assumed notions of 
possibility and necessity and thus—in my view—[it puts] the cart before the 
horse’. A defender of serious essentialism, contra the ersatz essentialism of the 
possible world theorists, thus seeks to follow Aristotle and, to a greater extent, 
John Locke, in construing an essence as “the very being of anything, whereby it 
is, what it is.” (Locke, 1975: III, III, 15, quoted in: Lowe, 2008, 34) In other words, 
what the essence of some entity x is, is what x is, or what it is to be x (Lowe, 2008). 
An essence is thus the whatness of an entity and therefore constitutes its identity.43 
Hence, serious essentialism seeks to provide a non–modal characterisation of the 
notion of essence through providing a means for one to identify, in a perspicuous 
manner, what an entity is.  
In addition to this, within this non–modal characterisation of essence, the 
essence of an entity comes in two different types: a general essence and an 
individual essence. What is central to this distinction is the fact that a given entity 
x must be a thing (i.e. an instance) of some general kind—at the very least, it must 
belong to an ontological category. And thus, as Lowe writes, if ‘x is something of 
kind K, then we may say that x’s general essence is what it is to be a K, while x’s 
individual essence is what it is to be the individual of K that x is, as opposed to 
any other individual of that kind’ (Lowe, 2008, 35). For example, we can take 
 
41 These 'possible world theorists' are individuals such as Saul A. Kripke (1980), Hilary Putnam 
(1975) and Alvin Plantinga (1974).  
42 For an explanation of the other issues against this approach, see: (Lowe, 2008), and the 
influential work of Kit Fine (1994). 
43 Where the type of identity featured in this case is not that of the relation of identity, which 
is symbolised by the equals sign “=”, and is the relation that everything necessarily bears to itself 
and nothing else. 




Socrates to be an instance of the general kind Human (i.e. he is a human–
instance), which results in Socrates’ general essence being what it is to be human, 
and his individual essence being what it is to be Socrates, as opposed to any other 
human.  
Importantly, however, this specific approach to essence provided by serious 
essentialism does not make the further move of reifying essences and thus taking 
an essence to be a further entity in addition to the entity that possesses it. Rather, 
entities have essences, but essences are not entities (i.e. an objectively real thing). 
Thus, as Lowe notes, an entity's essence “does not literally contain any entities as 
parts or constituents, since only entities can have other entities as parts.” (Lowe, 
2013, 195) The ‘parts’ that feature in an individual and general essence are parts 
of the real definition which expresses those essences. Thus, the notion of a real 
definition plays a central role in the approach to essence proposed by Lowe's 
serious essentialism. Lowe takes a real definition to be the “definition of a thing 
(res, or entity) in contradistinction to a verbal definition.” (Lowe, 2012b, 935, 
parenthesis in text) That is, a statement of essence is a real definition, which 
specifies what it is to be a particular entity. As Lowe further writes: 
 
a real definition of an Entity, E, is to be understood as a proposition which tells 
us, in the most perspicuous fashion, what E is, or, more broadly, since we do not 
want to restrict ourselves solely to the essences of actually existing things, what 
E is or would be. (Lowe, 2012b, 935) 
 
Real definitions thus serve as explanatory principles and are (usually) formulated 
through a ‘<To be___>‘ construction, such as ‘<To be X is to be Y>‘. For example, 
a real definition of Gold takes the following form: ‘<To be Gold is to be a metal 
whose atomic constituents have the atomic number 79>’.44 The definiendum—the 
entity that appears on the left side of the '<To be___>' construction—is the entity 
to be defined, which in this case is the phrase 'Gold'. And the definiens—the entity 
that appears on the right side of the '<To be___>' construction—performs the 
function of uniquely identifying and explaining the essential nature of the 
definiendum, which, in this example, is the phrase 'a metal whose atomic 
constituents have atomic number 79'. A statement that purports to express a real 
definition, in the sense just explained, is successful if, as Kathrin Koslicki points 
out, it “not only uniquely identifies and delineates the entity to be defined but 
also states what it is to be the entity in question, i.e. if it is explanatory of the 
essential nature of the definiendum.” (Koslicki, 2012, 200) Thus, a real definition 
enables one to further understand what it is to be a certain kind of entity. That is 
to say that if the definition is successful, then it will express the identity of the 
specific object. The defining entity thus provides a distinct way of referring to the 
 




essence of the entity to be defined—with the entity on the right side of the ‘<To 
be___>‘ construction being definitionally related to the entity on the left side of the 
‘<To be___>‘ construction—which results in the definiens providing one with 
further illumination about the definiendum. Given this sort of definitional 
relationship, the entities which feature within the real definition of another entity 
are said to be in a constitutive relationship. In the words of Koslicki (2012, 2013),45 
we can construe this constitutive relationship as one of essential constituency, 
which can be defined as follows: 
 
(EC) Essential Constituency =df. An entity, x, is an essential constituent of an 
entity, y, just in case x is a constituent in a real definition of y. 
 
The entities that fulfil the role of being the essential constituents of another entity 
pertain to (or feature within) the real definition of that specific entity and 
therefore contribute to defining the entity as it is. Taking this all into account 
within a Trinitarian context, we can construe the essence, real definitions and 
essential constitution of the Trinitarian persons as follows:  
 
45 Koslicki (2012, 2013) proposes the notion of essential constituency within the context of 
explicating some more ‘fine–grained’ notions of ontological dependence in the contemporary 
literature and adds another clause to (EC) that an x must also be a constituent of y itself. This 
additional clause will not be included within the notion of essential constituency employed in this 
article. Furthermore, Lowe himself does not utilise this notion in formulating his serious 
essentialism. However, the terminology is useful for referring to the entities that constitute the 
real definition of a given entity. Therefore, for this reason, this terminology will be utilised in the 
rest of this article.  
Trinitarian General & 
Individual Essences 
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In the Trinitarian real definitions posited by Monarchical Trinitarianism*,46 the 
particular identities (i.e. individual essences) of the Son and the Spirit, as 
 
46 An adherent of pro–Nicene Trinitarianism could potentially raise the objection that the 
characterisation of the Father’s essence is incomplete (or, worse, it is potentially ‘Eunomian’), due 
to it only stating that he is essentially an uncaused divine person and not that he is essentially the 
uncaused cause of the Son and the Spirit—plausibly making him the Father. In short, within pro–
Nicene Trinitarianism, the Father is essentially Father and not only essentially uncaused. Thus, 
according to this objection, we have not correctly captured the Father’s essence, which, if we had, 
it would be clear that the Son and the Spirit are essential constituents of the Father and thus the 
subsequent argument against the multiple–modes objection is incorrect. However, to deal with 
this objection one simply needs to further precisify the nature of an essence by focusing on a 
distinction that has been introduced by Kit Fine (1995, 57) into the contemporary metaphysical 
literature. This distinction is between a constitutive essence—the propositions that are true in 
virtue of the identity of a given entity—and a consequential essence—the propositions that are a 
logical consequence of the propositions that are true in virtue of the identity of a given entity. 
Now, plausibly, we can say that it is the constitutive essence of an entity that is the type of essence 
that is divided into an individual and a general essence, due to the consequential essence of an 
entity including certain propositions that are not related to the identity of that entity. Thus, the 
description of the Trinitarian essences featured above is solely that of the persons' individual 
Divine Person (i.e. an 
essentially, everlastingly 




Particular Kind of Entity: 
(i) Caused to exist by the 
Father. 
(ii) The means by which the 
Father causes the Spirit to 
exist. 
 
<To be the Son, is to be the 
divine person who is caused to 
exist by the Father and the means 
by which the Father causes the 
Spirit to exist>. 




Kind of Entity: 
Divine Person (i.e. an 
essentially, everlastingly 
omnipotent person).  
 
Particular Kind of Entity: 
(i) Caused to exist by the 





<To be the Spirit, is to be the 
divine person who is caused to 






The Father and 
the Son. 





expressed by (SONRD) and (SPIRITRD), include that of each other and the Father. 
With the Father’s particular identity, as expressed by (FATHERRD), not including 
that of either the Son or the Spirit. Monarchical Trinitarianism* thus takes it to be 
the case that where certain what–questions are asked,47 such as: what is it to be the 
Father?’, ‘what is it to be the Son?’ and ‘what is it to be the Spirit?’, it would thus 
be the specific real definitions featured above (i.e. (FATHERRD), (SONRD) and 
(SPIRITRD)) that supply the proper answers to these questions. That is, the correct 
answers for the second and third Trinitarian what–questions focused on the Son 
and the Spirit would thus include that of two of the other Trinitarian persons as 
essential constituents of it. Whilst, the answer to the Father’s what–question would 
have no entity external to himself featuring as an essential constituent of it. By 
the Father being part of the real definitions that express the (individual) essences 
of the Son and the Spirit, the Father would be included within the synchronic 
identity and existence conditions of the Son and the Spirit—the conditions for an 
entity to be identified as the Son or the Spirit at a given time.48 Taken this way, 
the Son and the Spirit would not be identified, and thus exist, as the Son and the 
Spirit, without the Father. The Father is part of the essence of each of the other 
Trinitarian persons by functioning in a way as the primary essential constituent 
of their real definitions,49 which ultimately leads to an individuation of the Son and 
the Spirit’s essence. 
The question that now remains is: how does this unpacking and application of 
the notion of serious essentialism help us to tackle the multiple–modes problem? 
Well, we can begin to answer this question by returning to the nature of a mode 
 
constitutive essences and their general constitutive essences. Therefore, why the Father is 
characterised as the uncaused divine person, rather than the uncaused cause of the Son and the 
Spirit, is not because the latter proposition is not essential to him—it is—however, it is simply 
because it is of the Father’s consequential essence, rather than his constitutive essence. Specifically, 
due to the Father’s possession of perfect goodness (which is part of his constitutive essence), it is 
a logical consequence that he would also cause the Son and the Spirit to exist—the proposition 
‘the Father is perfectly good’ is true in virtue of the identity of the Father and the proposition ‘the 
Father causes the existence of the Son and the Spirit’ is a logical consequence of the former 
proposition. Thus, the Father is essentially Father, but Fatherhood is not of his individual 
constitutive essence; instead, it is solely of his consequential essence, and thus there is no problem 
in characterising the essence of the Father in the manner that has been done above.  
47 What–questions, as Sam Cowling notes, ask ‘for the metaphysically significant features of an 
individual and are answered only if they explain what some individual really is’ (Cowling, 2013, 
4). 
48 More specifically, these conditions for the Son and the Spirit will include the Father and one 
of the other divine persons—the Father and the Spirit for the Son; the Father and the Son for the 
Spirit. 
49 With the Son and the Spirit serving as secondary essential constituents of each other’s real 
definitions, through them also being included within each other’s synchronic identity and 
existence conditions. 




that we discussed within the four–category ontology. Modes, as previously 
noted, are instances of attributes (i.e. non–substantial universals/properties) and 
are a particular way that an object is. A distinctive characteristic of a mode is that 
of its dependence profile, which expresses the fact that a given mode does not only 
depend for its existence on the particular object that it characterises, in the 
manner of rigid existential dependence, but that it also depends on the object for 
its identity as well. A mode is thus an ontologically dependent entity that 
essentially depends for its existence and identity upon the object that it 
characterises. It is part of the essence of a particular mode that it exists and is 
identified as the particular mode that it is, only in reference to the particular 
object that it characterises (Lowe, 2006). Modes are thus essentially identity–
dependent on their bearers, which, following Tahko and Lowe (2015, §4.2), can be 
construed more specifically as follows: 
 
(ID) x depends for its identity upon y =df. There is a two–place predicate ‘F’ such 
that it is part of the essence of y that y is related by F to x. 
 
This specific account of identity–dependence (ID), centres around the fact of it 
being part of the essence of x that x depends for its identity upon y, in such a 
manner that which thing of its kind y is fixes (or at least helps to fix) which thing 
of its kind x is (Lowe, 1998). It is part of the essence of x that it is the entity that it 
is, in virtue of standing in the unique relationship of F (a function) that relates it 
to y, such that y fixes, or metaphysically determines, which entity x in fact is. In 
further clarifying the notion of ‘function’ here, Koslicki (2013) has highlighted the 
fact that this notion, as it occurs in (ID), should be understood with a criterion of 
identity. That is, this relation of identity–dependence is a direct consequence of 
the identity criteria that govern the kind which the item is related to as an 
instance (Lowe, 1998). Thus, for example, taking ‘Φ’ to stand for a sortal term, 
such as a set, and ‘R’ to stand for a specific relation in terms of which the criterion 
of identity is formulated, we have a formal construal of this in a set–theoretic 
case: 
 
(CI) (∀x)(∀y) ((Φx & Φy) → (x = y ↔ Rxy)). (Koslicki, 2013, 171) 
 
One instance of (CI) is provided by the Axiom of Extensionality, which functions 
as a criterion of identity for sets—where, if x and y are sets, then x and y are the 
same set if, and only if, x and y have the same members (Lowe, 1998). The set’s 
members determine the identity (or individuality) of the set, which is to say that 
they individuate the set (Tahko and Lowe, 2015). Or, in other words, which set a 
specific set in fact is, is fixed by which members the set has (Koslicki, 2013). Thus, 





for entities that exist in time, we are to construe (CI) for present purposes as 
yielding a synchronic criterion of identity or what may also be called a principle 
of individuation, i.e. a criterion that specifies what it takes for an entity to be the 
very entity that it is at a time, rather than a diachronic criterion of identity, i.e. a 
criterion that specifies what it takes for an entity to persist over time. (Koslicki, 
2013, 53, emphasis in text) 
 
Thus, taking this notion into account, a mode is an entity that depends for its 
identity on the identity of the particular object that it characterises. The identity 
of a particular object fixes the identity of a specific mode—which entity of its kind 
the particular object is, metaphysically determines which entity of its kind a 
specific mode is. The particular object thus acts as an individuator of the specific 
mode that characterises it. However, in the case of a mode, there is no reciprocal, 
or symmetric dependence, in that the identity of the particular object is not fixed 
by the relation that it essentially bears to the modes that characterise it. It is part 
of the essence of a mode that it is the mode of a specific object (and not of any 
other object) in virtue of being possessed by that specific object (Lowe, 2006). A 
mode’s identity and existence conditions are thus determined by the particular 
object that it is a mode of. 
Returning back to our discussion of the multiple–modes problem, through our 
application of the notion of serious essentialism, we identified that the Father is 
the sole entity within the Trinity that does not have either of the two other 
Trinitarian persons being ‘included within’ his real definition as essential 
constituents. The Son and the Spirit thus do not feature in the Father’s synchronic 
identity and existence conditions.50 But the Son and the Spirit do, in fact, have the 
Father (and each other) as essential constituents, and thus they also have him 
(them) as features of their synchronic identity and existence conditions. This 
distinction in the identity conditions of the Trinitarian persons has implications 
for the manner in which the divinity–modes that characterise each of the 




50 For brevity, we can call these conditions the 'identity conditions'. 























So, what we see here is that if one were in fact to posit the existence of a divinity–
mode that characterises each of the Trinitarian persons, as was previously done, 
then it seems to be the case that, according to (SON–MODEID) and (SPIRIT–
MODEID), the Son and the Spirit’s divinity–modes would also be identity–
dependent upon them and each of the other Trinitarian persons who serve as their 
essential constituents. Focusing for example on the Son, the Father, who is the 
primary essential constituent of the Son, and the Spirit, who is the secondary 
essential constituent of the Son, would not just ‘fix’ (or metaphysically 
determine) the identity of their own divinity–modes, but also that of the identity 
of the Son’s divinity–mode as well, which does seem to be problematic. One 
could try and go along with this, but then one would be faced with the difficult 
issue of the identity conditions of the Son and the Spirit’s divinity–modes’ being 
If x is the Father, then y is 
the same person as x iff y 
is 
(i) the uncaused divine 
person 
The Father is 
characterised by a 
divinity–mode. 
 
The identity of the Father’s 
divinity–mode is identity–




Identity Conditions  
If x is the Son, then y is 
the same person as x iff y 
is 
(i) the divine person 
caused to exist by the 
Father  
 
(ii) the means by which 
the Father causes the 




Mode Characterisation    
The Son is characterised 




Mode Identity–Dependence  
The identity of the Son’s 
divinity–mode is identity–
dependent upon the Son and 





If x is the Spirit, then y is 
the same person as x iff y 
is 
(i) the divine person 
caused to exist by the 
Father through the Son. 
 
 
(SPIRIT–ModeC)   
Mode Characterisation 
The Spirit is characterised 
by a divinity–mode. 
 
(SPIRIT–ModeID) 
Mode Identity–Dependence  
The identity of the Spirit’s 
divinity–mode is identity–
dependent upon the Spirit 
and the Father and the Son. 
 




indeterminate. That is, the question would be presented to one concerning which 
divinity–modes are each of them in fact of? Is a given divinity–mode the Son's, 
the Spirit's (or the Father’s)?52 We would thus have no good ground to say that 
the identities of the modes are, in fact, fixed and determined in a certain or specific 
way (i.e. as the Son's mode or the Spirit's mode).53 And, because of this, we would 
thus lack further grounds to assert an identity–dependence between the divinity–
mode, and the identity of the particular object that they must, in fact, depend 
upon.  Given this, the divinity–modes would lack, what Lowe terms a 'principle 
of individuation', which, as he writes, 'is a principle which tells us what is to 
count as one instance of a given kind' (Lowe, 1998, 74). Thus, implored by the 
need to hold to the identity–dependence of a mode, given the importance of this 
within the four–category ontology explicated above, one could ‘bite the bullet’ 
and, for example, take the Father and the Spirit to collectively be the 
individuators of the Son’s divinity–mode. However, a further problem would 
need to be faced here, which is that of the fact that a mode is identity–dependent 
upon the particular object that it characterises. Thus, if the Father and the Spirit 
were collectively the individuators of the Son’s divinity–mode, and thus his 
divinity–mode being identity–dependent upon him and them, then this mode 
would have to also not just be dependent upon the Son, the Father and the Spirit 
collectively, but also characterise them collectively as such: 
 
(vii) The Son and the Father and the Spirit are characterised by divinity–mode d2  
 
And extending this to the Spirit, we would have the following being true as well: 
 
(viii) The Spirit and the Father and the Son are characterised by divinity–mode d3 
 
However, in both of these cases, we are seemingly forced to transform a mode—
a non–shareable, particular way that characterises a single particular object—into 
a universal—a shareable, universal way, which can characterise more than one 
particular object (or, more specifically, one particular kind). Therefore, in dealing 
with this issue, we are faced with the two options of either: 
 
(Option A): negating the possession of divinity–modes by the Son and the Spirit 
 
which will result in one not being presented with these problems, or, 
 
52 With the question here concerning the Father being the ‘additional’ modes that stem from 
the Son and the Spirit and not his own individual divinity–mode. 
53 However, we would be able to do this for the Father's individual divinity–mode, but not for 
the ones that stem from the Son and the Spirit, as the Father 'fixes' the identity of his own divinity 
mode.  





(Option B): retaining the possession of divinity–modes by the Son and the Spirit 
 
which could potentially saddle one with the issue of the divinity–modes being 
universal–like entities that lack determinate identity conditions. At a prima facie 
level, (Option A) does seem to be more plausible, as if the Son and the Spirit are 
essentially constituted entities, then there clearly cannot be any divinity–modes 
that characterise them. That is, given that the Father is the sole essentially un–
constituted entity in the Trinity, we can say that the Son and the Spirt are in fact 
not characterised by any divinity–modes (or any modes in general) at all. Instead, 
it is only the Father who is characterised by a divinity–mode, through his 
divinity–mode being solely identity dependent on him, in that the identity of the 
Father, and the Father alone, fixes (or metaphysically determines) which mode 
the mode that characterises him is. So Monarchical Trinitarianism*, as it is now 
being construed through (Option A), posits that within the Trinity there is only 
one divinity–mode: the Father’s, with the Son and the Spirit each not possessing 
a divinity–mode. This position, however, does not result in the Son and the Spirit 
lacking divinity or a relationship to the one divine nature (i.e. the divinity–
attribute). As within the ontological framework of the four–category ontology, as 
noted previously, there are two different ways in which objects may be related to 
an attribute: the first by instantiating kinds that are characterised by the attributes, 
which is a dispositional state of affairs (expressed by dispositional predication). 
And, the second, by being characterised by modes which instantiate the attribute 
themselves, which is an occurrent state of affairs (expressed by occurrent 
predication). Now, what is being negated in Monarchical Trinitarianism*, under 
(Option A), is solely that of the obtaining of the second type of state of affairs: an 
occurrent state of affairs including the Son and the Spirit. Thus, what is important 
for us to secure the divinity of the persons, and their relationship to the divine 
nature, is that of each of the persons exemplifying divinity in at least one of the 
above ways. Which, more specifically, is that of the Father, the Son and the Spirit 
each being in some type of (indirect) relationship of exemplification to the 
divinity–attribute. Thus, in Monarchical Trinitarianism*, under (Option A), it is 
simply that of the divinity–attribute not being occurrently exemplified by the Son 
and the Spirit (and solely by the Father alone). There is no state of affairs where 
the Son and the Spirit each occurrently exemplifies divinity by being 
characterised by a divinity–mode that, in turn, instantiates the divinity–
attribute.54  
 
54 In a predicative sense, the following would be true: ~Occ[s, D], where ‘~’ stands for ‘not’, ‘s’ 





However, what is maintained within this framework is that of the Father solely 
occurrently exemplifying the divinity–attribute, and the Father, the Son and the 
Spirit each dispositionally exemplifying the same attribute.55 There is thus a state 
of affairs where the Father occurrently exemplifies divinity by being 
characterised by a divinity–mode that, in turn, instantiates the divinity–attribute. 
Moreover, there is also a state of affairs where the Father, the Son and the Spirit 
each dispositionally exemplify divinity, through instantiating the kind Deity, 
which is, in turn, characterised by the divinity–attribute.56 Taking this into 
account, we can now turn our attention back to the Ontological Square, which 
will remain the same for the Father’s exemplification of the divinity–attribute 
(bottom, left), whilst we can now also provide an alternative Ontological Square 
(bottom, right) to express the relationship between the Son and the Spirit and the 





As we can see in the alternative Ontological Square above, the framework of the 
four–category ontology, under (Option A), does not feature the category of a 
mode for the Son and the Spirit. The reason for this is because the Son and the 
Spirit are essentially constituted by the Father (and each other), which results in 
them not exemplifying the property of divinity in both a dispositional and 
occurrent manner. Rather, each of the Trinitarian persons exemplifies the 
divinity–attribute solely in the sense of exemplifying the kind Deity. Whilst it is 
the Father alone who exemplifies the divinity–attribute in an occurrent manner. 
Thus, under (Option A), this ontological framework, in conjunction with serious 
 
55 It’s important to emphasise here that dispositionality does not equate to potentiality, in that 
the Trinitarian persons only potentially exemplify the divinity–attribute. Rather, dispositionality, 
again, is simply a shorthand for the exemplification of an attribute, by instantiating a kind that is 
characterised by that attribute. The Persons truly and actually exemplify this attribute, though 
through this indirect, dispositional manner. 
56 In a predicative sense, the following would be true for both cases: Occ[f, D] and Dis[s, D], 
where ‘f’ stands for ‘the Father’, ‘s’ continues to stand for ‘the Son’ (who now serves as a 
representative of each of the Trinitarian persons), and ‘D’ continues to stand for the divinity–
attribute 
Figure 1.6 Ontological Square (Trinitarian Version 1) & (Trinitarian Version 1A) 
 




essentialism, provides a means for to affirm the exemplification of the divinity–
attribute by the Trinitarian persons, whilst negating the Son and the Spirit’s 
possession of any modes of divinity. There is thus one mode of divinity in the 
Trinity, which is that of the Father’s. That said, even though this method for 
dealing with the multiple–modes problem is indeed intriguing, an issue that it 
faces is that of it creating some type of ontological distinction between the 
Trinitarian persons—the Father has something outside of his relational properties 
(i.e. a divinity–mode) which the Son and the Spirit do not have. This, however, 
would clearly be problematic for someone who holds to the traditional pro–
Nicene position of the Trinitarian persons being distinguished from one another 
solely by their relational properties.57  
Thus, despite this being an interesting approach, one might prefer to take 
(Option B), which focuses on taking the divinity–modes to characterise more than 
one particular object. Understood this way, these modes lack determinate 
identity conditions and become universal–like entities, which seems to be clearly 
problematic within the ontological framework that we are operating within. 
Thus, in this case, an important question we now face is whether there is a way 
to take this option without having to incur the problems associated with it. That 
is, can a divinity–mode remain an ‘identity–determined’ mode, even though it 
characterises more than one particular object? In response to this question, Lowe 
(1998) thinks that this type of scenario could occur in cases involving the 
existence of numerically distinct spatiotemporally coincident objects.58 A famous 
example of this type of object is that of a statue and the clay that constitutes it. In 
a case like this, one could say that the statue and the clay that constitutes it share, 
for example, the same weight–mode which characterises each of them—if the 
statue weighs 1 KG and the clay weighs 1 KG, then they don't together weigh 2 
KG. Rather, there is one and the same weight–mode that characterises the statue 
and the clay.59 This line of thought can be extended now to the Trinitarian case 
through focusing, not so much on the notion of material constitution, but rather 
on the serious essentialist notion of essential constituency introduced above. 
Within this framework, we can take the Son and the Spirit to be characterised by 
the same divinity–mode: the Father’s, by each of them 'coinciding' with him.60 
 
57 Cf. (Ayres, 2004, Ch.14); (Swinburne, 2018, 5). 
58 Lowe (1998) focuses on the case of coinciding spheres rather than the following example of 
a statue and the clay that constitutes it. However, due to the familiarity of the latter case in the 
contemporary literature, we will instead focus on this specific type of example.  
59 I am grateful to Professor Koslicki for making me aware of this example in private 
correspondence. 
60 Interestingly this accounts for the fact for why there is, for instance, no causal over–
determination when the Trinitarian persons perform a given action together as there is one power 





Thus, we can take the persons of the Trinity to be essentially (or definitionally) 
coincident objects. In other words, as was shown above, the Son and the Spirit have 
the Father (and each other) as essential constituents. And thus, the essence (or real 
definitions) of the Son and the Spirit each coincide with one another's and the 
Father's. However, as the Father lacks the other persons as essential constituents, 
he alone has a divinity–mode that directly characterises him, with the Son and the 
Spirit being characterised by this same, numerically singular divinity–mode. More 
specifically, by the Father being an essential constituent of the Son and the Spirit, 
they are indirectly characterised by the Father's own divinity–mode.61 In light of 
this, the Son and the Spirit can be taken to be entities that occurrently exemplify 
the divinity–attribute in an indirect manner through their characterisation by the 
divinity–mode being mediated through the Father. However, as pointed out 
previously, the Father occurrently exemplifies the divinity–attribute in a direct 
manner by him not having his character given to him in any mediated way. Thus, 
given this, we can provide a final alternative construal of the Ontological Square. 
Where, again, the Ontological Square will remain the same for the Father’s 
exemplification of the divinity–attribute (bottom, left). Whilst in the alternative 
Ontological Square (bottom, right) we can now maintain, under (Option B), the 
(indirect) occurrent exemplification of the divinity attribute in the case of the Son 
and the Spirit who are each characterised by the Father’s divinity–mode (below 




In this case, it is important to note, however, that the problems that plagued 
(Option A) do not affect (Option B). As, firstly, there is no ontological distinction 
between the persons of the Trinity, but only a distinction in the way that the 
divinity–attribute is occurrently exemplified. That is, each of the persons of the 
Trinity occurrently exemplifies the divinity–attribute—the Father directly 
occurrently exemplifying it, whilst the Son and the Spirit indirectly occurrently 
exemplify it. Secondly, the divinity–mode that characterises the Son and the 
Spirit does indeed have determinate identity conditions through being ‘fixed’ (or 
 
61 This is without, however, a reification of these essences. 




metaphysically) determined by the Father alone. Thirdly, the fact that the Son 
and the Spirit share the Father's divinity–mode in this specific way does not make 
this mode into a universal. This is because this mode only properly (i.e. directly) 
characterises one particular object: the Father. The Son and the Spirit partake in 
it simply because of the Father's role as an essential constituent of them. In light 
of all of these considerations, we reach the position that there is solely one 
divinity–mode—a single–same divinity–mode—that (directly) characterises the 
Father and which also (indirectly) characterises the Son and the Spirit. Therefore, 
(Option B) provides a plausible and problem–free way forward that, contra the 
multiple–modes problem, does not allow a proliferation of divinity–modes (and 
thus natures) within the Trinity. Given all of this, we can now re–state the two 
conditions of Monarchical Trinitarianism* (with a modification made to the social 
strand (S)) as follows: 
 
 
We can also illustrate the additional modification made here through another 
diagram that captures the main tenants detailed above (where the other terms 
and symbols are as before, with the addition now of ‘EC’ standing for ‘essential 
constitution’, and ‘Ex’ standing 
for the ‘exemplification 
relation’ (which now 












(MT*1) (S*) There are three relationally distinct persons (i.e. pure mental 
substances) within Trinity: the Father, the Son and the Spirit, each of 
whom (dispositionally and occurrently) exemplifies the one divine nature 
(i.e. the same divinity–attribute) and thus are each equally termed ‘God’ 
(in the predicative sense).  
(M) The one ‘God’ (in the nominal sense) is numerically identical to one of 
the entities: the Father, who is the sole ultimate source of the Son and the 
Spirit. 





Finally, assuming the modifications made above, we can now also state a re–
construal of the definition of the homoousion of the persons (H*) as follows: 
 
(H*1) the Father, the Son and the Spirit are homoousios =df. the Father, the Son and 
the Spirit each dispositionally and (directly or indirectly) occurrently exemplify 
the one divinity–attribute. 
 
Thus, taking (H*1) into account, we can re–assert our previous conclusion that 
Monarchical Trinitarianism*, as further construed through the neo–Aristotelian 
ontological (and metaphysical) framework of Lowe, posits one divinity attribute, 
exemplified by the Father, the Son and the Spirit. The Trinitarian persons, as 
expressed by (H*1), are indeed homoousios, and thus the ‘multiple–natures’ 





In this article, a metaphysical development was made to a specific Trinitarian 
model within the Greek–speaking pro–Nicene Trajectory: Monarchical 
Trinitarianism, which dealt with the underdevelopment problem that plagued 
the model. The development that was provided in the first section of this article, 
which was termed Monarchical Trinitarianism*, generated a specific problem: 
the 'multiple–natures' problem, which needed to be dealt with if this 
development of the model was to be ultimately accepted. This problem was 
addressed in the second and third section of this article by re–situating the model 
within the robust, neo–Aristotelian ontological framework provided by Jonathan 
Lowe: the four–category ontology. Doing this, however, generated a further 
problem: the 'multiple–modes' problem, which also needed to be dealt with if the 
metaphysical modifications made to Monarchical Trinitarianism were not going 
to strip it of its orthodox credentials. This problem was ultimately addressed in 
the fourth, and final section of this article, through an explication and application 
of Lowe’s neo–Aristotelian metaphysical thesis: serious essentialism. A neo–
Aristotelian construal of the Trinity thus provided a way for one to locate a 
metaphysically robust version of Monarchical Trinitarianism within the 
boundaries of pro–Nicene Trinitarianism. 
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